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Abstract 
Commercial Aspects of SHG Banking in India 
 
There are two outstanding aspects to Nabard’s Linking Banks and Self-Help Groups:  with an 
outreach to 500,000 SHGs and a population of 40m rural poor, it is the largest non-directed 
microsavings & microcredit programme in the developing world; and its bank lending rates – 
fluctuating at market rates around 7% in real terms – are among the lowest. Is it a commercial 
proposition for the 17,000 participating bank branches, and perhaps for another 20,000 who might join 
the program to reach a population of 100m by 2008? 
 
We are presenting a methodology for the study of financial products, applied to seven units of three 
banks in October 2002. The results are indicative only. We applied average cost analysis, attributing 
all costs duly to each product; and marginal cost analysis, in response to the advice of bank managers 
to ignore personnel costs of SHG banking because of existing idle capacities. Main performance 
indicators are non-performing loans, return on average assets, and operational self-sufficiency.  
 
Non-performing loans to SHGs were 0%, testifying to the effectiveness of group lending to the very 
poor. In contrast, consolidated NPL ratios ranged from 2.6% to 18%; and of Cash Credit (CC) and 
Agricultural Term Loans (ATL) up to 55% and 62%, respectively.  
 
Returns on average assets of SHG Banking ranged from 1.4% to 7.5% by average and 4.6% to 
11.8% by marginal cost analysis, compared to –1.7% to 2.3% consolidated. The operational self-
sufficiency of SHG banking ranged from 110% to 165% by average and 142% to 286% by marginal 
cost analysis, compared to 86% to 145% consolidated. In contrast, ROA of Cash Credit varied from  
–10.2% to –0.5% and of ATL from –6.3% to 0.2%; OSS ratios from 54% to 102%. SHG Banking was 
found to be a robust financial product, performing well in healthy and distressed financial institutions.  
 
Self-reliance of SHGs based on internal savings and retained earnings was found to be rapidly 
growing, exceeding in older groups the volume of bank refinance by an increasing margin. In addition 
SHGs deposit substantial amounts of savings voluntarily in banks as a reserve for bad debts.  
 
In addition to direct effects on bank profits, SHG Banking has indirect commercial effects on banks 
in terms of improved overall vibrancy in banking activities. Indirect benefits at village level include 
the spreading of thrift and financial self-reliance and of a credit culture among villagers, 
microentrepreneurial experience, growth of assets and incomes, the spreading of financial 
management skills, and the decline of private moneylending. Intangible social benefits are reportedly 
many: self-confidence and empowerment of women in civic affairs and local politics, improved school 
enrolment and women’s literacy, better family planning and health, improved sanitation, reduction of 
drinking and smoking among men, and a decline in adherence to local extremism.  
 
The future sustainability of SHG Banking hinges on five factors: (a) A sound self-supporting 
institutional framework is in place. (b) Despite exceptionally low interest rates, linkage banking was 
found to be viable and profit-making for all financial institutions and SHGs; however, many rural 
banks require restructuring. (c) SHGs have substantially increased their level of self-reliance and 
deposited reserves, while banks are constrained by high statutory liquidity requirements. (d) Given the 
low inflation rate, preservation of the value of resources is no major issue, except in distressed banks. 
(e) With continually increasing internal funds, effective supervision of SHGs through a delegated 
system, together with the enforcement of prudential norms in banks and cooperatives, emerges as a 
major challenge to the long-term sustainability of SHG banking and rural finance in India. 
 
Among the topics for further study are: pricing of financial products in a random sample of rural 
financial institutions; extending SHG Banking to the middle poor; options of delegated supervision for 
SHGs and cooperatives; collateral for larger loans within SHGs; loan protection through life 
insurance; and options for individual performance incentives in banks and cooperatives. 
   1 
Scepticism about the financial viability of microfinance is largely due to a lack of 
information on the profitability of microfinance programs and institutions in India, 
including the dominant self-help group model. (The World Bank, June 2001: 6) 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
1.1 SHG Banking in India: is it viable? 
 
Nabard’s programme  Linking Banks and Self-Help Groups aims at providing sustainable 
access to financial services to the rural poor, with a focus on those who had been considered 
unbankable. By using the existing rural financial infrastructure of 150,000 banking and 
cooperative retail outlets and linking them to savings and credit groups with joint liability, 
there are economies of scale and scope, resulting in substantially lower transaction costs. 
National implementation started in 1996, after four years of pilot-testing. Due to massive 
support from governmental and non-governmental agencies and the banking sector, the 
programme grew rapidly and, by March 2002, encompassed 461,000 self-help groups (now, 
in November, more than 500,000) with 8m members, covering 40m household members. 
Average loan sizes are Rs 22,240 ($463) per SHG and 1,300 ($27) per member.
2 
 
With its balanced emphasis on both savings and credit, it is the largest microfinance (and not 
just microcredit) programme in the developing world. By 2008, it is expected to cover a 
population of 100m, which is one-third of India’s rural poor. 209 commercial banks, 191 
regional rural banks and 44 commercial banks are involved as SHG Banking partners, with 
17,085 participating branches. There can be no doubt about the programme’s outreach to the 
poor; but is it viable for the banks? Is SHG Banking a poverty-lending program, which may 
be of immense benefit to the poor, but only thrives on subsidies; or is it a commercial 
proposition that can be recommended to all banks as an instrument of both outreach and 
institutional viability?  
 
1.2 Nabard’s bank refinancing: does it distort rural financial markets? 
 
There has been a long-standing tradition of government owned agricultural development 
banks distorting financial markets with cheap credit and thereby, contrary to their good 
intentions, undermining rural finance and development as well as their own viability. It is also 
feared that easy money, even at market rates, discourages savings mobilization and thereby 
undermines self-financing and self-reliance of financial institutions and clients.  
 
Nabard belongs t o the new world of rural finance: it is profit-making;
3 and it actively 
promotes the viability of the rural banks under its supervision. As an investment in the SHG 
Banking infrastructure, it has established a microfinance development fund (MFDF) of Rs 
1.06bn (US$22.1m), 43% of which is financed from Nabard’s retained earnings. 
 
Banks have cumulatively provided Rs 10.3bn ($214m) in loans to SHGs; estimated loans 
outstanding as of March 2002 amounted to Rs 6.9bn ($144m). 80% of cumulative bank loans 
have been refinanced by Nabard; from 2001 to 2002; Nabard’s refinance has declined from 
86% to 72% and is expected to continue declining. Nabard has provided its funds at interest 
                                                 
2 Exchange rate: 1 USD = 48 Rupees. 
3 At zero percent non-performing assets, the return on average assets (ROA) of Rs 419bn = US$8.7bn for the 
fiscal year 2001-02 was 3.5%. This rate can be compared to that of agricultural development banks elsewhere, 
most of which are loss-making,  but not directly to that of deposit banks, which have substantially higher costs of 
funds.    2 
rates between 7% and 9.5%, depending on the prevailing market rates. During 2002, interest 
rates have been falling;
4 as of November, Nabard cut its small-loan interest rate down to 
6.75%. 
 
No compulsory deposit is required from the SHGs; but all SHGs have turned into grassroots 
financial intermediaries and mobilize savings vigorously. They use them mainly for internal 
lending, but also deposit substantial amounts as reserves in the bank. 
 
There is no evidence thus, neither on theoretical nor on empirical grounds, that easy access to 
Nabard’s liquidity has distorted rural financial markets; nor has it discouraged rural banks
5 
and SHGs from mobilizing deposits, which have continued to grow substantially. However, 
given the existence of excess liquidity in the rural banking sector and the growth in savings 
mobilized, it is expected that Nabard’s liquidity will continue to be fully available to new 




Case study approach: Our study is not statistically representative; we did not draw a random 
sample. Instead, we are presenting seven indicative case studies of the profitability of SHG 
banking during Fiscal Year 2001-2002:  
￿  The Gudur branch of Andhra Bank, a national commercial bank  
￿  Kakathiya Grameena Bank, a regional rural bank (RRB) in Warangal, and two 
branches in Parkal and Palakurthy 
￿  The District Cooperative Central Bank in Bidar, its Bhosga branch and an associated 
primary cooperative society, the PACS of Ladwanthi.
6  
In the RRB, we also include profitability data for 1999-2000 and 2000-01. In three of the 
branches, we compare the profitability of SHG banking to that of other financial products: 
Agricultural Term Loans and Cash Credit. The field work was carried out in October 2002. 
 
The conclusions and recommendations are indicative and cannot be generalized. SHG 
Banking is not a standardized approach in India, all stakeholders in the various states and 
districts being free to do it their own way without rigid rules of targeting, loan terms, loan 
purposes, or interest rate determination. This would have made it difficult to directly embark 
on a profitability study with a rigorous representative survey. We have tried to avoid a bias in 
favor of well-performing banks, which might do well with any financial product. There is a 
good and a medium bank among the three banks; one is technically bankrupt.  
 
Developing a methodology: The main value of the study is therefore methodological: we 
have tested an instrument, which anyone may use to examine the financial feasibility of SHG 
linkage banking at the level of bank branches, banks or districts. Our approach is innovative 
in the sense that it provides the banks with an instrument for measuring the profitability of 
any of its financial products, which we have seen none of the banks doing.  
 
                                                 
4 Average three-month fixed deposit rates: 6.0%; average bank rate as of 15 Nov.: 6.25%). 
5 Liquidity requirements for rural banks are considerable: there is a statutory liquidity ratio of 25% for all banks, 
plus a cash reserve ratio of 5.5% in 2002 (down from 10.5% in 1999) for commercial banks and 3% for regional 
rural and cooperative banks. 
6 The study was preceded by a qualitative study by the first author, as IFAD Rural Finance Adviser, in February 
2001. See H. D. Seibel & S. Khadka, SHG Banking: A Financial Technology for Very Poor Microentrepreneurs. 
NABARD’s Program of Promoting Local Financial Intermediaries Owned and Managed by the Rural Poor in 
India. IFAD Rural Finance Working Paper No. A9, 2001; also published in: Savings and Development (Milan) 
26/2 (2002): 133-149.    3 
Average vs. marginal cost calculation: Our estimates of general head office and branch cost 
attributions have been on the conservative side. We have therefore used average, rather than 
marginal, cost calculations, treating SHG Banking as a normal product which shares in all 
costs. However, as some branch managers have pointed out that they have ample free 
capacities, combine visits to SHGs with other trips due to villages, and therefore incur no 
additional personnel costs, we have also calculated marginal costs in those case studies where 
it appeared appropriate.  
 
How to deal with the basic costs of social mobilization, such as group formation, group 
maintenance, and training? Is this part of building a rural infrastructure, like roads and 
bridges, or are these product costs to be factored in? In cases where they were clearly 
externalized in NGOs or government agencies, we excluded them. They were included when 
borne by the banks or SHGs.  
 
Introducing vs. mainstreaming SHG Banking: Here we have to distinguish between the 
early phase of introducing, and the mature phase of mainstreaming, SHG Banking. In the 
latter, we found that compensation of non-bank field personnel stationed in the villages such 
as assistant supervisors and volunteers was variously borne, without outside subsidy, by 
banks, cooperatives or SHGs; and was accounted for in our cost calculations when borne by 
the banks. Training expenses incurred by the banks were included, but posed an additional 
problem: should they be considered as current expenses; or as an investment in human and 
social capital to be spread over a period of time? Here we offer alternative calculations.
7  
 
The performance indicators (expressed in percent) used in the study are given below; of 
these, we have mainly used NPL, ROA and OSS, based on monthly averages. Administrative 
costs were attributed to the respective financial products on the basis of their proportion of the 
total number of accounts. As SHG Banking has both a savings and a credit component and 
loan accounts are more labour-intensive, the savings accounts were given a weight of 30% 
and loan accounts of 70%.
8 In the branches, income from SHG savings deposited in the head 
office and the cost of SHG loan funds are based on the transfer price mechanism adopted by 
the respective banks. 
 
Non-performing loans (NPL):
9  Amount overdue >180 days from end of quarter /Portfolio 
outstanding 
Return on average assets (ROA):
10  Net income/Average assets 
Return on average loans (ROL):  Net income on loans/Average loans 
Operational self-sufficiency (OSS):
11  Operating income/Operating expenses incl. cost of funds 
Self-sufficiency in funds:  Deposits/Loans outstanding 
                                                 
7 Balance sheets, profit & and loss accounts, loan recovery data and performance ratios are given in the annexes 
in Excel; the files, with detailed footnotes, will be provided upon request by nabmcid@vsnl.com. . 
8 We arrived at this calculation after lengthy discussions with the bank managers, discarding two options: the 
volume of deposits and loans outstanding; and the number of vouchers of savings and loan transactions. 
9 Loan loss provisions were included on an actual basis as prescribed by RBI. In bank branches, retained 
earnings or losses are transferred to the head office balance sheet and not included in branch balance sheets. 
10 Return on equity (ROE) is not used in this study, as equity is only assigned to a bank as a whole and not to 
branches or products. 
11 Mainly used in the microfinance community and by the donor consultancy group CGAP. Operating expenses 
comprise interest expenses, personnel expenses, loan loss provision, and other operational costs. Some authors 
erroneously exclude interest expenses from total operating expenses and thereby arrive at inordinately high OSS 
ratios, which may be well above 100% in loss-making institutions. We are not using the (CGAP) financial self-
sufficiency ratio (FSS) here, which indicates the extent to which an institution covers its operational costs and 
preserves the value of its resources by accounting for subsidies and the effects of inflation:  
Operating income/(financial costs + operating costs + loan loss provision + imputed cost of capital).   4 
 
2.  Case studies of rural banks 
 
2.1 Kakathiya Grameena Bank, a Regional Rural Bank in Warangal District, AP 
 
Warangal in Andhra Pradesh is an agricultural district with 3.2m inhabitants in 1,080 
villages. 50% of arable land is irrigated, largely by tanks (water reservoirs). Land holdings 
are small and fragmented. Of the 620,000 families, about 100,000 are agricultural labourers 
and 50,000 are microentrepreneurs. There are 18 banks in the district with 210 bank branches, 
167 of them with a rural service area, plus 180 cooperatives. In the district, 23,000 SHGs have 
been formed, 19,000 of which are operational, 13,000 of them with loans outstanding. The 
district is considered a vanguard in higher education and in extremism.  
 
The Kakathia Grameena Bank (KGB), a regional rural bank (RRB), was established in 
1982 and has been in losses for the first 17 years of its existence, made profits for two years 
and went again into the red during the last year due to the court-ordered payment of salary 
arrears for a ten-year period. Recoveries were around 25%-30% and increased to around 50% 
- with a peak of 62% - during the last five years. Annual loss ratios are estimated at 7-8%. The 
bank has a negative networth; this is not shown in the balance sheet, as accumulated losses are 
hidden under “other assets.” Between 1988 and 2002, KGB’s business has gone up 
substantially: from 62m to 1.4bn in deposits and from 89m to 1.03bn in loans, while the 
number of staff has changed little: from 163 to 181. Its market share in the district is 9.0.  
KGB is considered as an RRB of average standing. 
 
KGB started SHG Banking in 1997 in cooperation with the District Rural Development 
Agency (DRDA) as the agency of social mobilization; which  has made large capacity-
building efforts through its Technology Training and Development Center and is now self-
managed and nearly self-financing. KGB now works with 6,589 groups, 3,350 of them with 
loans outstanding. The basic data are summarized below; further details are given in the 
annexes. 
 
KGB basic data (31/3/2002)  Bank  Parkal branch  Palakurthy branch 
Number of branches  







Start of SHG Banking  1997  1998  1997 
Total number of loan accounts 







Total number of deposit accounts 







Number of SHG members (estimated)  98,835  8,475  4,125 
Interest rates on loans: 
  Non-SHG loans 






SHGs account for 6.0% of the bank’s loan portfolio and 1.4% of total deposits: 
In Parkal, SHGs account for 9.7% of total loans and 3.5 of total deposits; 
In Palakurthy, SHGs account for 6.2% of loans and 4.3% of deposits.    5 
 
KGB selected balance sheet data, 31/3/2002  Consolidated  SHG 
(Amounts in Rs ‘000)    Amount  % of bank 
Total assets 
  Net loans outstanding 




















Viability of SHG Banking comes early: Profitability of SHG Banking has come early for 
KGB. Data were not available for a profitability analysis during the first two years of SHG 
Banking; but during the third and fourth year, it was already substantially profitable, with a 
ROA (at fiscal year-end) of 1.7% [ bank : 1.0 %] in 1999-2000  and 1.66 % [ bank : 0.9 %] in 
2000-01. . Needless to say, at a higher interest rate, the bank would have reached profitability 
quicker.   During 2001-02, the ROA of SHG Banking went up to 2.5%, while the bank was 
heavily into losses (bank ROA: –1.7%). Using marginal instead of average cost calculation, 
its ROA would have been 4.7 %, 3.6% and 4.7%, respectively for the three years. Its 
operational self-sufficiency ratio in 2001-02, using the CGAP formula which indicates the 
extent to which a bank covers its total operational costs including costs of funds, was 126% 
according to average, or 163% according to marginal cost calculation.  
 
Selected profit & loss account data, 31/3/2002 
(Amounts in Rs Million)  Consolidated  SHG 
Total operational income  194.90  7260 
Total operational expenses 
  Interest expenses 
  Personnel expenses 
       Direct SHG social mobilisation costs 
  Loan loss provision 














            Adjusted profit (marginal cost calculation) 




The commercial performance of SHG Banking is astonishing, given the fact that interest 
rates to SHGs are at the low end of the bank’s interest rate structure. This performance is 
largely due to a zero rate of non-performing loans, compared to 10% in the bank as a whole 
(2001/02). 
 
Performance data, 31/3/2002 
(in percent)  Consolidated  SHG 
Non-performing loans  [ in % to total ]  10.0  0 
Return on assets (ROA) 
  Adjusted (marginal cost calculation) 
-1.7  2.5 
4.7 
Operational self-sufficiency (CGAP)  
  Adjusted (marginal cost calculation) 
86  127 
163 
Self-reliance (bank deposits/bank loans)   137  33 
 
 
The savings performance of SHGs has surpassed most expectations; but this is difficult to 
present in detail as only bank deposits are being monitored. Bank deposits by SHGs have 
increased substantially over the years, representing 33% of loans outstanding as of March 
2002. The deposits-to-liabilities ratios in the bank and the two branches are given below, 
indicating that at branch level SHG deposits account for about half the liabilities.   6 
 
Deposit-to-liability ratios, 31/3/2002 
  Consolidated  SHGs 
KGB  69%  25% 
Parkal branch  82%  50% 
Palakurthy branch  83%  100% 
 
 
SHGs are required to first build up their own internal lending business, which is entirely 
based on internally mobilized resources. As resource mobilization continues from savings and 
substantial earnings from a margin of 12%, the larger share of is kept in the groups and 
recycled among the members in the form of loans. In Warangal District, there are reportedly 
some 500 SHGs with own resources of more than Rs 100,000 ($2,000), of which 250 have 
more than Rs 200,000 ($4,000).  
 
How does SHG Banking compare to other products? In the branches of Parkal and 
Palakurthy, we extended our study to include profitability analyses of the two financial 
products: cash credit (CC) and agricultural term loans (ATL). Parkal works with 328 SHGs, 
of which 235 have loans outstanding; Palakurthy with 275 SHGs, of which 126 have loans 
outstanding. In both branches, SHG Banking is profitable at ROAs around 1% by average 
cost calculation and around 5% by marginal cost calculation.  
 
Parkal is a loss-making branch, with 18% of its portfolio in arrears and NPA of 16%. SHG 
Banking outperforms CC and ATL by a wide margin, which have high arrears ratios (55% 
and 62%, respectively) and negative ROAs (-8.7% and –6.2%, respectively).  
 
Parkal branch (31/3/2002)  SHG  Cash credit  ATL  Branch 
Total assets  3,406  1,856  2,531  69,636 
Net loans outstanding (in Rs ‘000) 
Average loans outstanding 
3,406 
3,022 
1,856  2,531  35,187 
64400 
Portfolio in arrears  0.0%  55%  62%  18% 
Return on (av.) assets (ROA) 
  Adjusted (marginal cost calculation) 
1.4% 
4.6% 
-10.2%  -6.3%  -0.4% 
Operational self-sufficiency (CGAP)  
  Adjusted (marginal cost calculation) 
110% 
142% 
54%  70%  98% 
 
 
In contrast, Palakurthy is a profitable branch, with arrears of 6.5% and a ROA of 1.0%. At 
19%, both CC and ATL have substantially higher arrears than SHG Banking at 1%. With 
average cost calculation, SHG Banking and CC are almost identical in profitability, while 
ATL is incurring a moderate loss at –0.7% of assets.  
 
Palakurthy branch (31/3/2002)  SHG  Cash credit  ATL  Branch 
Total assets  1,950  1,645  3,228  54,241 
Net loans outstanding (in Rs ‘000) 
Average loan outstanding ( in Rs.’000) 
1,561 
1455 
1,645  3,228  25,277 
47667 
Portfolio in arrears  0%  19.3%  18.8%  6.5% 
Return on (av.) assets (ROA) 
  Adjusted (marginal cost calculation) 
3.9% 
6.1% 
-0.5%  -1.3%  1.1% 
Operational self-sufficiency (CGAP)  
  Adjusted (marginal cost calculation) 
129% 
154% 
97%  91%  107% 
 
 
   7 
Indirect effects of SHG Banking, include:  
￿  an increase in the bank’s overall repayment rate, due to the influence of the SHG 
women members 
￿  increased overall vibrancy in branch business, due to the economic activities of SHGs 
in the villages, very much welcomed by the branches where “large underutilized 
capacities” exist 
￿  substantial decrease in the reliance on moneylenders, many of whom have reportedly 
gone out of business, while the remaining ones have tended to lowered their interest 
rate (from 5% to 3% on the declining balance). 
 
Intangible or social effects are reportedly many, which are attributed to a significant degree 
to the vibrancy of the SHGs, but are difficult to quantify. In a district where SHGs first 
appeared in1993, a study by the DRDA in Warangal claims that there an impact on the 
following: 
￿  Women’s literacy, which increased from 14% in 1981 to 28% in 1991, but jumped to 
49% between 1991 and 2001 
￿  Population growth, which declined due to improved family planning from 23% during 
1971-81 und 24% during 1981-91 to 14.6% during 1991-2002 
￿  School enrolment, which is 92% among the children of SHG members 
￿  Vaccination of children 
￿  Access to drinking water 
￿  Sanitation 
￿  Political empowerment of women, who gained 34% of seats in local self-government 
institutions (against a stipulation of 30%) and now take an active influence on local 
politics 
￿  Local extremism (naxalites), which has declined due to improved earning 
opportunities, increased school enrolment and direct action by women.  
   8 
 
2.2 District Cooperative Central Bank (DCCB) in Bidar District, Karnataka 
 
Bidar, with a population of 1.4m in 600 villages and 300 hamlets, is a remote and backward 
district in Karnataka State; only 10% of cultivated land is irrigated. 52% of the 280,000 
families are below poverty; 30% belong to scheduled castes and tribes. 
 
The DCCB in Bidar, established in 1922, is considered among the best of 356 cooperative 
banks in India, consistently earning profits for the last ten years. It functions as a central 
cooperative bank in the region, which delivers its services through two channels: 43 branches, 
which are profit centers, and 171 primary agricultural cooperative societies (PACS), which 
are autonomous local financial institutions. This applies also to SHG Banking, which is 
financed by the bank through its branches and through PACS. There are 37 different loan 
products with different interest rates: some of them a relic of supply-led directed lending to 
agriculture; diversification into the rural non-farm sector started during the late 1980s. 
 
 
DCCB basic data (31/3/2002)  Bank  Bhosga branch  Ladwanthi PACS 
Number of branches  






Start of SHG Banking  1996  1999  1999 
Total number of loan accounts 
SHGs loan accounts (with outstanding):* 
  Through branches: 





   
Total number of deposit accounts 
SHGs deposit accounts* 
49,191 
7028 
   
Number of SHG members  84,095     
Interest rates on loans: 
  Non-SHG loans 




* There are some incongruencies in the data, as the bank originally financed SHGs only through its 
 branches; and as of 2000 started to encourage PACS to finance SHGs. 
** As of 1/4/2002: 12.5% on loans up to Rs 25,000. 
 
Total assets of the bank amount to Rs 4.44bn, loans outstanding to Rs 3.43bn, deposits to Rs 
0.56bn. Its Return on Assets is 0.8%.  
 
DCCB Bidar (31/3/2002)  SHG  Bank 
Total assets (in Rs. Million)  45.0  4,438.4 
Net loans outstanding (in Rs million)  44.9  3,425.0 
Deposits  12.1  561.5 
Non-performing loans (in %)  0.0  2.7 
Return on (av.) assets (ROA) 




Operational self-sufficiency (CGAP) 
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SHG Banking: DCCB started SHG Banking in 1996. By March 2002, a total of 6900 SHGs 
had been established in Bidar District, comprising about 100,000 members from poor 
families. 5005 SHGs had opened savings accounts with DCCB; and 3,005 had been credit-
linked: 1,183 financed by societies and 1,822 financed by the branches. Of 3,117 SHGs ever 
financed by DCCB, 3,005 (96%) have loans outstanding. Among the SHG promoting 
agencies, NGOs are the most active organizers of SHGs in the district; primary cooperatives 
are second in importance; the government’s women development programme, Stree Shakti, is 
third. 
 
SHGs linked to DCCB by self-help promoting agency (SHPI), 31/3/2002 
SHPI  SHGs with savings accounts  SHGs with loan accounts 
  Number  %  Number  % 
PACS  1866  37  1123  36 
NGOs  2374  47  1345  43 
Women’s org. (Stree Shakti)  765  15  649  21 
   Total  5005  99%  3117  100 
 
Profitability of SHG banking: Due to its heavy expenditure on SHG promotion through 
training and the establishment of a Micro Credit Division, SHG Banking in DCCB is just 
breaking even, with a the return on assets of 0.1% and an OSS is 101%. However, if we 
assume that training expenditures are long-term investments in human capital and should be 
amortized over five years, the ROA surges to 2.1% and the OSS to 118%. 
 
Institutionalizing SHG Banking: DCCB has institutionalized SHG Banking, fully bearing 
its costs, through four channels: 
DCCB 
Micro Credit Division 
With 15 staff members 
43 branches, 
40 in SHG Banking 
171 PACS 
77 in SHG Banking 
1952 SHGs 
1183 with loans 
3053 SHGs 
1822 with loans 
84,095 SHG members 
80,148 women   10 
￿  a microcredit division 
￿  six local training centers for SHG and other training within the district 
￿  a national training center for banks and other institutions from throughout India 
￿  SHG supervisors at PACS level: 
 
The bank has established a separate Micro Credit Division functioning as an SHPI, with 15 
officers. The division has trained all branch and PACS staff and has developed PACS as SHPI 
as the bank’s own direct instrument of sustainable SHG promotion at the grassroots level. The 
bank provides training in SHG Banking through its local training centers, located on the 
second floor of block branches and staffed by personnel from the block branches. All costs of 
the Micro Credit Division and the local training centers are included in the profitability 
analyses at the respective institutional levels. In addition, the bank trains SHG supervisors as 
PACS staff, whose costs are transferred to the PACS over a three year period; the bank bears 
75% of the costs during the first year, 50% during the second year and 25% during the third 
year. The bank has also developed a network of NGOs as facilitators, receiving a 1% margin 
from the SHGs. Saharda, a national training center established by the bank, does not serve the 
district. As a subsidiary of the bank, it is fully self-supporting and does not enter into our 
calculations.  
 

























Micro Credit Division 
SAHARDA national 
training center 






77 ass’t supervisors of PACS 
SHGs trained   11 
The branch of  Bhosga : Of the bank’s 43 branches, 40 participate in SHG Banking.We 
studied the branch of Bhosga, which acts as an intermediary for 6 PACS, where 129 SHGs 
hold their accounts.Most of the the outstanding SHG portfolio is covered by SHG deposits. 
There are no non-performing SHG loans, compared to an overall NPL ratio of 2.6% of the 
branch. The branch earned 2.3% on its total average assets, equivalent to an OSS of 121%, 
and 4.2% on SHG Banking, equivalent to an OSS of 157%. 
  
DCCB branch Bhosga (31/3/2002)  SHG/PACS  Branch 
Total assets (in Rs. ‘000)  1,650  39,233 
Net loans outstanding (in Rs ‘000)  1,607  34,654 
Deposits  1,500  10,472 
Non-performing loans  0%  2.6% 
Return on (av.) assets (ROA) 




Operational self-sufficiency (CGAP) 





The PACS of Ladwanthi: Of 171 PACS in the district, 77 participate in SHG Banking; it is 
planned that eventually all PACS will participate. Until about 2001, the PACS served as a 
mere credit channel and received a commission of 1.5% from the bank branches, with the risk 
borne by the branch. At present, the bank’s policy concerning the role of PACS in SHG 
Banking is contradictory: the PACS are not permitted to determine their own interest rate; 
they receive a fixed margin of 1.5%, but bear the full risk. The PACS in the district are slow 
recovering from poor performance in the past due to non-performing loans and a low level of 
business activities. This is now changing; and this change is largely attributed to the vigor of 
the SHG business. 
 
The PACS of Ladwanthi has 1,065 regular members, 135 women; 664 members have loans 
outstanding. Most of the members are land owners; but anyone can become a member. Only 
land owners can borrow, unless two land-owning members provide guarantees. SHGs are 
nominal, non-voting members. Admitting SHG members, who are mostly poor women, as 
regular members on a broad scale – some are already members  – would totally alter the 
composition of membership. 
 
The PACS provides financial services to 69 SHGs; 43 of them have loans outstanding. SHG 
deposits account for 38% of outstandings, which is identical to the share of overall deposits in 
overall outstandings. Non-performing loans in the PACS are coming down, but are still high 
at 3.6%. In contrast, NPLs are zero in the cooperative’s lending to SHGs. The PACS earns 
1.5% on its total assets and 2.0% on its SHG assets. The PACS attributes much of the change 
over the last three years to its participation in SHG linkage banking and its indirect effects on 
cooperative members: an increase in deposits from Rs 1.3m to Rs 3.5m; an increase in loans 
outstanding from Rs 4.1m to Rs 9.1m; and increase in the recovery from 91% to 94%. There 
is new, almost forgotten, awareness that the society accepts deposits; 12 out of 113 fixed 
deposit holders are SHG members. 
 
PACS, Ladwanthi (31/3/2002)  SHG  PACS 
Total assets (in Rs. ‘000)  1,320  12,503 
Net loans outstanding (in Rs ‘000)  1,262  9,131 
Deposits  481  3,524 
Non-performing loans   0%  3.6% 
Return on average assets (!) (ROA)  2.0%  1.5% 
Operational self-sufficiency (CGAP)  116%  113%   12 
 
Profitability of SHG Banking: SHG Banking is breaking even (with a slight positive 
margin) at bank level, where the overhead costs for the Microcredit Division are borne, while 
the bulk of the profit-making SHG business is shifted to the branches and PACS. At bank 
level, marginal cost calculation is therefore not appropriate. At branch and PACS level, SHG 
Banking is highly profitable: above the profitability of the respective units. 
 
Profitability of SHG Banking, 31/3/2002 
Unit  ROA  Adjusted ROA 
DCCB 




Branch of Bhosga   4.2%  7.7% 
PACS of Ladwanthi  2.5%   
 
 
Impact on SHG savings, retained earnings and borrowings: There is a strong impact of 
SHG membership on savings behavior; in many SHGs, the amount of individual weekly 
savings has quadrupled from Rs 5 to Rs 20, which has substantially increased the volume of 
loanable funds and retained earnings. As of August 2002, SHGs in the district had total 
savings of Rs 120m and retained earnings of Rs 90m (common fund), totaling internal 
resources of Rs 210m, which is nearly five times  the amount of bank loans of Rs 45 m. Total 
working capital is thus Rs 255m ($5.26m). The annual total turnover of SHGs is reportedly 
Rs 500m. The repayment rate is 98%; non-performing loans are zero. 
 
Amounts  Resources of SHGs  
in Bidar District, 8/2002  Million Rs.  Million $ 
Percent 
Savings  120  2.50  47 
Retained earnings  90  1.88  35 
   Total internal resources  210  4.33   
Bank loans  45  0.93  18 
Total resources  255  5.26  100 
 
 
The proportion of SHG deposits in terms of loans outstanding in the three entities studied is as 
follows: 
Bidar DCCB consolidated  :  27% 
Branch of Bhosga    :   93% 
PACS of Ladwanthi    :  38% 
 
Indirect benefits of SHG Banking in the district are pronounced. 38% of the families in the 
district, and 72% of poor families are SHG members with access to financial services. SHG 
Banking is considered the main factor in the turn-around of primary cooperatives from sleepy, 
loss-making entities, open for a couple of hours per week, into increasing active member-
societies, with frequent opening hours. At the same time, it has added vibrancy to the bank 
branches. DCCB has provided data for estimating indirect benefits, comparing data for 1998 
and 2002, but attribution is virtually impossible, except in the case of passbook savings in 
PACS, where the SHG portion has amounted to 93% in 2002:
12 
 
                                                 
12 M. Shripathy Rao (Director of Saharda) & B.S. Kudre (Senior Adviser): SHG Movement in Bidar District: 
Indirect Benefits. DCCB Bidar, November 2002.   13 
￿  Total deposits in 43 bank branches increased from Rs 0.75bn to Rs 2.5bn (233%) 
￿  Total deposits in 171 PACS increased from Rs 26.6m to Rs 136.7m (414%) 
￿  SHG deposits in the form of passbook savings in bank branches increased from Rs 
0.7m to Rs 12.1m (1648%) 
￿  SHG deposits in the form of passbook savings in PACs increased from Rs 0.3m to Rs 
17.4m (5275%) 
￿  The recovery rate of the branches has increased from 70% to 89% 
￿  The recovery rate of the PACS, where the impact of SHG members in stronger, has 
increased from 72% to 95% 
￿  The number of profit-making PACS has increased from 93 to 131 
￿  Many moneylenders have gone out of business; the remaining ones have reduced their 
interest rates due to competition by SHGs. 
 
Intangible benefits:  The DCCB paper lists the following intangible effects, which are 
directly attributed to the SHG social movement: 
 
￿  Self-confidence and self-discipline among women, resulting in a more active personal 
and family life 
￿  Empowerment of women, who are increasingly involved in community development 
programs and local politics 
￿  Exposure of bad habits of family members harassment of women, resulting changing 
male attitudes and behavior 
￿  Exposure of social evils such as child marriage, child labour and dowry. 
 
 
2.3 The Gudur Branch in Warangal District of Andhra Bank, a national commercial 
bank 
 
Andhra  Bank is a government-owned national commercial bank, with its head office in 
Hyderabad. It has 1031 branches throughout India, 37% rural and 28% peri-urban. Its total 
assets as of 31/3/2002 amounted to US$4.29bn, its loans outstanding to $1.98bn and its 
deposits to $3.79bn. Its net non-performing assets were 1.1%; its return on assets was 1.0%.  
 
With a total number 55,000 SHGs financed (27,349 during 2001-02), Andhra Bank is among 
the top bank performers in SHG Banking in India. We studied one branch, not the bank as a 
whole. The following basic information on the bank as a whole is taken from the annual 
report for 2001/02: 
 
Andhra Bank, 31/3/2002  Rs billion  US$ million 
Total assets  209.4  4,290.4 
Loans outstanding  96.8  1,983.1 
Loans outstanding to SHGs  1.0  21.0 
Deposits  184.9  3,789.1 
Total profit  2.0  41.5 




No. of SHGs financed  54,908 
 
The Gudur branch of Andhra Bank in Warangal District comprises a branch office and, as a 
result of a merger in 2000-01, a satellite branch It has 2,714 loan accounts, 12% of them 
SHGs; and 7,447 deposit accounts, 8% of them are SHG accounts. It covers 26 villages with   14 
100,000 inhabitants, at a distance of 5-20km. Large parts of the area are under forests and 
have sizeable tribal populations. 
 
Gudur branch, Andhra Bank(31/3/2002)  Bank 
Start of SHG Banking (savings) 
  Start of credit linkage 




Total number of loan accounts 




Total number of deposit accounts 
SHGs deposit accounts 
7,447 
632 
Number of SHG members (estimated)  9,480 
Interest rates on loans: 
  Prime lending rate 
  Non-SHG loans 






The branch has been consistently profit-making since 1998. In 2001-02, its non-performing 
loans stood at 5.6% of average assets; its ROA was an impressive 2.3%, its operational self-
sufficiency ratio 145%.  
The comparative performance of the SHG product vis-à-vis Agricultural Term Loans and the 
aggregate branch performance for the year 2001-02 is given below : 
 
Gudur branch selected balance sheet data 
(31/3/2002) (in Rs ‘000) 
SHG  ATL  Branch 
Total assets 







Net loans outstanding (in Rs ‘000)  4,154  4,938  34,323 
Deposits  943    51,154 
Non-performing loans  0.0%  21.3%  5.6% 
Return on average assets (ROA) 






Operational self-sufficiency (CGAP)  
  Adjusted (marginal cost calculation) 
165% 
264% 
102%  145% 
 
SHG Banking was introduced upon the initiative of the District Rural Development Agency 
(DRDA), which established the first 68 groups through its officers in 1997; initial 
disbursements were made through the District Collector. Subsequently, the DRDA organized 
and trained village volunteers, who were paid by each SHG Rs 15 per month for guidance and 
bookkeeping services. The success of the early groups and the initiatives taken by the groups 
and the volunteers led to a rapid increase of SHGs in the branch’s service area. 
 
At the Gudur branch, SHG Banking initially met with skepticism and therefore took a slow 
start. Up to 1999, there were only few savings and credit activities of the branch with SHGs. 
The rapid spread of the movement and the excellent repayment performance of the SHGs, 
with zero percent non-performing assets, turned the branch manager around. Within three 
years, the number of SHGs with deposit accounts rose to 632; and the number of SHGs with 
loans outstanding to 324. 
 
Only SHGs collect savings at village level and deposit them in the branch on market days, at 
near-zero saver transaction costs. The branch has responded to the extra demand for services 
and on market days keeps its counters open until evening.   15 
 
Profitability of the branch, SHG Banking and Agricultural Term Loans: SHGs banking 
performs exceedingly well in the Gudur branch: 
￿  Non-performing loans to SHGs are zero, compared to 5.6% at branch level and 21.3% 
of ATL 
￿  ROA of SHG Banking is 7.5%, compared to 2.3% of the branch and 0.2% of ATL 
￿  OSS is 165% for SHG Banking, compared to 145% for the bank and 102% for ATL. 
 
According to the branch manager, the branch is underemployed and carries out SHG Banking 
at no additional administrative costs. All mobilization and maintenance costs are externalized 
and borne by the DRDA or SHGs, respectively. It is therefore appropriate to recalculate the 
profitability of SHG Banking, using marginal cost analysis, with the following extraordinary 
results for the SHG Banking product: 
￿  ROA-marginal:  11.8% 
￿  OSS marginal:  264%. 
 
Interest rate: One of the main determinants of profitability is the interest rate. The branch 
lends to SHGs at 11%, which is the lowest interest rate of any of its loan products. This makes 
the profitability of SHG Banking all the more astonishing and is indirect evidence of the 
efficiency of the branch and the linkage partners.  
 
Direct impact: According to the branch manager, SHG Banking has the following direct 
effects: 
￿  The spreading of thrift among members and non-members 
￿  Excellent credit culture, with SHG members fully observing their loan obligations. 
￿  Higher economic activities and family income of SHG members 
￿  Asset creation, such as cows, agricultural implements and land among SHG members 
￿  Access to credit by non-members (at 3% interest per month, compared to  2% to 
members and 5% charged by moneylenders). 
 
Indirect effects reportedly include the following: 
￿  Higher savings volume mobilized from the village 
￿  Spill-over effect on repayment behavior of poor and non-poor farmers 
￿  Extremists (naxalites), as a result of interaction, accept and encourage SHGs and leave 
participating bank branches unharmed. 
 
Intangible effects  reportedly include improved adult literacy, drastic increase in school 
enrolment, better health, family planning, support for government programmes, and a decline 
in adherence to the extremist movement. 
   16 
3.  Summary and conclusions
13 
 
3.1 Interest rates and flow of funds 
 
Funds flow in two directions: credit from Nabard through banks to SHGs and their members; 
savings and repayments in the opposite direction.  Interest rates, a major determinant of 
profitability, are deregulated and fluctuate according to the market. During 2001-02, the 
following lending rates prevailed: 
 
￿  Nabard, a profit-making apex development bank, refinances banks engaged in SHG 
Banking at 7% (real: 2.3%); its share of finance has declined from 86% to 72% and 
continues to decline. There is no evidence of distorting effects on rural finance. 
￿  Banks have refinanced SHGs at rates between 9.75% and 16% since the beginning of 
the program; and during 2001-02, at around 12% of interest effective p.a. (real: 7.3%), 
which is at the low end of their interest rate spectrum and far below interest rates of 
comparable financial products in other countries.
14 
￿  SHGs mostly lend at effective rates of 2% per month or  24% (real: 19.3%) per 
annum. 
 
Lending rates of banks/PACS in %, 2001-02  SHG Banking  Other products 
Kakathiya Grameena Bank, Warangal  12.5-13.0  13-17 
Andhra Bank Gudur branch, Warangal  10.75-11.75  11-16 
District Coop Central Bank, Bidar, to branches 









Profitability has been measured in terms of Return on Average Assets (ROA), a standard 
performance measure in the banking industry, and Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS), which 
is widely used in the non-banking microfinance community. Two methods of analysis have 
been used: (i) average cost analysis, in which all costs including personnel expenses are duly 
attributed to SHG Banking;
15 and (ii) marginal cost analysis, based on the assumption, where 
appropriate, that excess capacities exist and SHG Banking causes no extra personnel costs to 
banking units. In terms of all measures used,  
 
￿  the profitability of the SHG Banking product is positive throughout all units studied, 
despite the very low interest rates charged by banks, with Returns on Assets ranging 
from 1.4% to 7.5% and Operational Self-Sufficiency ratios from 110% to 165%; 
￿  it  significantly exceeds the profitability of the respective units: bank, branch or 
cooperative society, using average cost analysis; 
                                                 
13 All figures are for the fiscal year 2001-2002 ending 31/3/2002 unless otherwise stated. 
14 At an average inflation rate of 4.7% during 2001-2002, real interest rates are: Nabard 2.3%; banks 7.3%; 
SHGs 19.3%. By comparison, the rural microbanking units of Bank Rakyat Indonesia, considered a benchmark 
AgDB, before the Asian financial crisis lent directly to clients at nominal rates of 44% minus 11% rebate for 
timely repayment = 33% effective p.a., equivalent to a real interest rate of about 24%. In the Philippines, bank 
and non-bank Grameen replicators charge annual effective rates of. 40-60% (real: 35-55%) and above. 
15 Administrative expenses are attributed to the SHG Banking product on the basis of the number of loan 
accounts with a weight of 75% and savings accounts with a weight of 25%. Using loans and savings balances or 
the number of vouchers results in somewhat different figures, but does not alter the overall picture.   17 
￿  using marginal cost analysis,
16 SHG banking exceeds the profitability of the respective 
units by a wide margin, with ROAs ranging from 4.6% to 11.8% (compared to –1.7% 
to 2.3% for the respective units) and OSS ratios from 142% to 286% (compared to 
86% to 145% for the respective units). 
 
Average cost analysis  Marginal cost analysis 
ROA  OSS  ROA  OSS 
Profitability of SHG Banking 
vs inst. unit by average and 
marginal cost analysis (%)  SHG  Unit  SHG  Unit  SHG  Unit  SHG  Unit 
Kakathiya Grameena Bank 
   Parkal branch 

























District Coop Central Bank 
   adjusted f. training amortization 
   Bhosga branch 

































Andhra Bank Gudur branch  7.5  2.3  165  145  11.8  -  264  - 
 
Amortizing training expenditure: Training expenditures are long-term investments in 
human capital and should not be fully accounted for in the year of accrual. The effect on 
profitability (and taxes) can be considerable. A considerable amount of such expenses 
occurred in DCCB at head office level. When amortized over five years, the ROA for 2001-
2002 surges from 0.1% to 2.1%; the OSS from 101% to 118%. 
 
Profits of SHG Banking account for around one-tenth of total profits of the unit studied. In 
the KGB branch of Palakurthy and the Andhra Bank branch in Gudur, its profit share is 11% 
and 10%, respectively; in the DCCB branch 6.2%; in the PACS 7%. In KGB as a whole and 
the KGB branch in Parkal, it reduces losses by 5% and 18%, respectively. Only in DCCB 
with its emphasis on the promotion of branches and PACS and its heavy investment in SHG 
promotion, the share of SHG Banking in total profits is negligible. 
 
Growth of profits was studied only in KGB. Over a three-year period, profits of the SHG 
Banking product grew eightfold from Rs 190,000 to Rs. 1.5m, while the bank went from 
profits to losses. 
 
Are interest rates to SHGs adequate? The interest rate margin is a major determinant of 
profitability. If cost of funds and portfolio quality remain constant, profits correlate directly 
with the interest rate. In several SHGs visited, we raised the question whether an increase of 
the interest rate fromaround 12% to 15% would create a problem; no objection was voiced 
against such a potential increase. None of the bankers, however, appeared interested in a raise 
of the interest rate, despite the fact that there might be no other country with such low market 
rates of interest to SHGs. To the contrary, in the present situation of generally falling interest 
and under the pressure of competition, the banks have been lowering the interest rate. Yet, the 
adequacy of interest rates to SHGs is a wider issue to be discussed in the community of 
bankers. The following arguments speak in favour of an increase in interest rates to SHGs:  
 
￿  Building up reserves to withstand downturns 
￿  Financing the expansion of SHG banking 
￿  Financing an SHG banking division with additional staff 
                                                 
16 Not applicable in DCCB at bank level, where a new microcredit division has been established; and at PACS 
level, where additional staff has been recruited.   18 
￿  Covering the social mobilization costs of SHGs, providing training, guidance and 
monitoring services 
￿  Taking the bank to the people and providing collection services in villages, thereby 
lowering client transaction costs 
￿  Expanding services to remote villages through mobile services 
￿  Facilitating microenterprise promotion 
￿  Increasing the overall direct interaction of banks with SHGs, which is on a low level. 
 
Profitability of SHG Banking vs. other products: Profitability analysis can be applied to 
any financial product and should guide a bank in the decision which products to offer, or to 
improve. Between the three branches studied, there is a definite ranking: The Andhra Bank 
branch, were only SHG Banking and ATL were studied, performed consistently best, the 
KGB branch in Parkal worst, incurring heavy losses on CC and ATL.Comparing the three 
products, SHG Banking outperforms the other products by a wide margin. It is only in the 
Andhra Bank where ATL breaks barely even; in the other two bank branches, both CC and 
ATL produce losses. The discrepancy between the three products is even wider when taking 
the interest rate into account: in KGB, the interest rate on SHG Banking is 13%; on CC and 
ATL, it is 15%-17%, depending on loan size.  
 
SHG Banking  Cash Credit  Agric. Term Loans  ROA of SHG Banking vs. 
CC and ATL (in %)  Average cost calc.  Marginal cost calc.  Average cost calc.  Average cost calc. 
KGB Parkal  1.4  4.6  -10.2  -6.3 
KGB Palakurthy  3.9  6.1  -0.5  -1.3 
Andhra Bank Gudur  7.5  11.8  -  0.2 
 
SHG Banking  Cash Credit  Agric. Term Loans  OSS of SHG Banking vs. 
CC and ATL (in %)  Average cost calc.  Marginal cost calc.  Average cost calc.  Average cost calc. 
KGB Parkal  110  142  54  70 
KGB Palakurthy  129  154  97  91 
Andra Bank Gudur  165  264  -  102 
 
The results of this comparison, as tentative as they may be, raise a number of issues:  
￿  The performance of different financial products clearly requires further study on a 
broad scale;  
￿  Such a study may provide an entry point to the reform of rural banks;  
￿  Tied products of savings-cum-credit hold great promise in improving the self-
financing capacity as well as credit discipline of clients; 
￿  The stark differences in performance of the financial products raise the question of 





Internal resources mobilized through savings and retained earnings are at the core of self-
reliance, self-help and self-financing. At the start of the SHG banking program, it was 
assumed that the poor have a demand for credit far beyond their savings capacity. SHGs were 
therefore perceived, in a long-term perspective, as net borrowers. However, by requesting 
groups to first build up internal lending activities with own resources as an eligibility criterion 
for bank credit, the foundation was laid for the establishment of groups functioning as local 
financial intermediaries: they mobilize savings, lend to members, and generate substantial 
earnings which in turn contribute to the growth of internal loan funds. This has resulted in the 
following:   19 
 
￿  Large numbers of SHGs are thrift groups, which have not availed of credit 
￿  Internal funds have grown substantially over time through savings and retained 
earnings, exceeding in many cases the amount of bank refinance 
￿  SHGs, which fully bear the credit risk, have deposited substantial amounts of savings 
in bank branches or cooperatives, mainly as a reserve for arrears and bad debts. 
 
The amounts of voluntary savings deposited by SHGs in banks as a proportion of loans 
outstanding vary in the seven case studies from 23% to 125%: 
 
Kakathiya     33% 
  Parkal     50% 
  Palakurthy    125% 
DCCB      27% 
  Bhosga    93% 
PACCS    38% 
Andhra Bank Gudur  23% 
 
Increasing self-reliance at village level, predominantly of poor women, is an outstanding 
direct effect of SHG banking.  
 
3.4 Indirect effects of SHG Banking  
 
Our profitability analysis has focused on SHG Banking as a financial product of banks. There 
are multiple other benefits which are difficult to quantify and have not been included in the 
profitability analysis; yet they deserve mentioning. There are claims that some of the indirect 
and intangible effects may be more important than the direct effects.  
 
Indirect commercial benefits for banks and PACS include spill-over effects, resulting in:  
 
￿  Increased overall vibrancy in branches where large underutilized capacities exist, 
resulting in higher overall volumes of deposits and loans 
￿  Improved loan recovery due to the influence of SHG members on other villagers 
￿  Substantially invigorated business in primary cooperatives 
￿  Better service extended to all clients; decline of Gheda banking
17 
￿  Expected future growth of business with SHGs and individual members. 
 
Indirect commercial benefits at village level reportedly include the following:  
 
￿  The spreading of thrift among members and non-members, resulting in improvement 
in self-reliance and self-financing 
￿  Excellent credit culture, with SHG members fully observing their loan obligations and 
spill-over effects on other villagers 
￿  Income-generating activities of SHG members, with growth of assets and incomes  
￿  Incipient commercialization of production, eg, in the dairy sector 
￿  Propagation of financial management skills at village level 
￿  Gaining entrepreneurial experience  
￿  Preparing the ground for direct microenterprise promotion 
￿ Decline of moneylenders, who have gone out of business or lowered their interest rate.  
                                                 
17 Gheda banks (a Panjabi term) are those which require many visits.   20 
 
Intangible social benefits  are reportedly many, attributed to a significant degree to the 
vibrancy of the SHG movement and its supporters:  
 
￿  Self-confidence and self-discipline among women, resulting in a more active life 
￿  Empowerment of women in community development programmes, civic affairs and 
local politics 
￿  Improved women’s literacy  
￿  Drastic increase in school enrolment 
￿  Population growth, which declined due to improved family planning from 23% during 
1971-81 und 24% during 1981-91 to 14.6% during 1991-2002 
￿  Vaccination of children and better health 
￿  Improved sanitation and access to drinking water 
￿  Changing male attitudes and behavior, reduction in drinking and smoking  
￿  Voicing of objections against child marriage, child labour and dowry. 
￿  Decline in adherence to local extremist groups. 
 
3.5 Sustainability  
 
The sustainability of any financial scheme including SHG Banking hinges on five factors:  
 
￿  the overall institutional framework;  
￿  the viability of institutions in terms of profitability at all relevant levels; 
￿  self-reliance in terms of resources; 
￿  the maintenance of the value of all resources under inflation; 
￿  regulation and effective supervision. 
 
This study of the commercial aspects of SHG Banking can only partially and indicatively 
answer to the question of sustainability, but it can point to strong and weak parts of the 
system:  
 
(a) Institutional framework: A sound overall institutional framework is in place. Its 
foundation are the SHGs, which have emerged as local financial intermediaries; its 
pillars are federations of SHGs registered as Mutually Aided Cooperative Societies 
(MACS), banks with their branches and primary cooperatives; supporting walls are 
governmental and non-governmental agencies; the roof is provided by Nabard.  
 
(b) Viability: Linkage banking was found to be viable and inherently profit-making for 
all participating financial institutions and the SHGs; despite unusually low interest 
rates of loans to SHGs, the profitability of SHG Banking is high for banks. Nabard, 
itself a profit-making institution, will continue to lend its support at market rates of 
interest. The costs of governmental and non-governmental support agencies are 
externalized and financed from other sources. Some banks have internalized the costs 
of institution-building and training and still make a profit; at higher interest rates, 
virtually all banks could internalize these costs and bear all its costs. However, the 
viability of the rural banking sector as a whole is a critical wider issue, which in many 
cases requires major restructuring, reorientation, and revamping of financial 
technologies; much can be learned here from SHG banking.  
 
(c) Self-reliance: SHGs have substantially increased their level of self-reliance through 
savings and retained earnings. In addition, they have contributed to the resources of   21 
banks by depositing significant amounts as reserves. Many banks are strong in 
liquidity, but constrained by high statutory liquidity reserve requirements. Further 
improvements are contingent upon a lowering of reserve requirements and internal 
reforms of rural banks. 
 
(d) Preservation of the value of resources: Inflation rates are low in India. Average 
deposit rates are above the level of inflation and thus positive in real terms; passbook 
savings, however, are slightly below. Erosion of the value of savings is therefore no 
serious problem. Retained earnings of SHGs are very high in real terms and offset the 
effects of inflation by a wide margin. This differs among banks: the profits of well-
performing banks from SHG banking are sufficient to offset the effects of inflation 
and generate profits in real terms. However, the financial self-sufficiency of poorly 
performing banks – their equity eroded by accumulated losses – needs to be addressed 
in the framework of bank restructuring; they would have to charge substantially higher 
interest rates to account for the effects of inflation and rebuild their capital base; 
however, increasing the interest rate would not suffice to solve their problems. 
 
(e) Regulation and effective supervision: Appropriate regulation of rural financial 
institutions is in place; but major efforts are still required to enable them to cope with 
the effects of liberalization and fully utilize market opportunities.  
 
(i)  Banks are adequately supervised; but action to close non-performing banks has 
rarely been taken in the past.  
(ii)  Cooperatives are under the dual supervision of Nabard and state governments; 
little effort has been made in the past to enforce prudential norms.  
(iii)  The deposits of SHGs in weak institutions, their continued access to credit and 
confidence in their banking partner are at risk. Effective internal and external 
controls and the enforcement of prudential norms are greatly in need of 
improvement throughout the rural financial sector.  
(iv)  Federations are registered as MACS and face the same challenges of prudential 
regulation and effective supervision as the whole cooperative sector. As their 
financial operations increase, action will be urgently requirement for damage 
control.  
(v)  (v-1) SHG Banking is not a rigidly reglemented programme; and SHGs as small 
local institutions owned and managed by their members are therefore not 
regulated. In fact, the flexibility of the approach has been a source of innovation 
and dynamic growth. With their growth in business, the question of legal status 
and regulation may eventually arise; among some of the older groups, it might 
already have arisen and require further study. (v-2) While most SHGs may not 
need to be regulated, they do need effective supervision: not to enforce prudential 
norms, which do not exist for the time being, but to have their books examined and 
fraud prevented. Tentative first steps have been taken in this direction by 
appointing assistant supervisors (Bidar) and village volunteers (Warangal), but not 
as part as a regular system of supervision; nor are they always adequately trained. 
Neither the banks nor any other institution is formally given the task of organizing 
supervision. With the continual growth of SHGs as local financial intermediaries, a 
delegated system of supervision
18 will eventually be indispensable. 
 
 
                                                 
18 In a delegated system, supervision is delegated by a central authority to organs at lower tiers, such as auditing 
apexes of networks of SHGs, cooperatives or types of banks.   22 
3.6 Follow-up studies 
 
As a main follow-up, we propose to carry out studies of: 
 
￿  Pricing of financial products 
 
This study may include an analysis of elements of the SHG Banking products and their 
incorporation in other financial products, such joint liability for small loans through in 
solidarity or self-help groups and credit appraisal by groups for larger individual loans 
without joint liability. The studies may be variously organized by the Indian Banks 
Association, State-Level Bankers Committees, District Consultative Committees, Sponsor 
Banks, Lead Banks, or Nabard; and carried out by appointed research teams or by research 
institutions. The results would be shared in the banking community. They may be used as a 
major element in the reform of rural financial institutions.  
 
 
Other topics which have emerged from this study as deserving further attention include: 
 
￿  How to extend SHG Banking to better-off market segments (“the middle poor”) 
￿  Effective supervision: Options of delegated supervision for SHGs, federations and 
cooperatives (MACS, PACS) 
￿  Collateral substitutes: the feasibility of informal collateral taken by SHGs from group 
members with larger loans 
￿  Loan protection through life insurance (with banks, PACS or federations acting as 
agents) 
￿  From targets to incentives: Options and legal implications of financial incentives for 
individual performance in banks and cooperatives 
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